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I. INTRODUCTION
There were no signs anything was wrong. Workers and staff at the
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in eastern Turkey regularly
reviewed the computer network’s readouts on pipeline pressure, and
there were no warning or distress signals.1 The BTC pipeline, major-
ity owned by British Petroleum (BP), was designed to be one of the
most secure pipeline systems in the world.2 The pipeline consisted of a
total of 1099 miles and ran from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterra-
nean Sea.3 To maintain security, the pipeline was outfitted with doz-
ens of sensors and cameras to monitor each section of the pipeline,
including a sophisticated backup satellite system to send alerts back
to the main control center if the nodes along the pipeline failed.4
These protocols and safety measures, however, would prove useless in
the face of a determined adversary.
On August 8, 2008, unidentified hackers launched a cyber attack
by infiltrating the surveillance cameras through the cameras’ wire-
less-connection feature and then using this access to connect to the
pipeline’s operating systems.5 Once inside, the hackers manipulated
the pressure along the pipeline by breaking into computer controls at
several different valve stations along the line.6 The hackers then tam-
pered with the alarm systems to stop any alerts or warnings, includ-
ing blocking the redundant satellite-warning-systems signals, so the
1. Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, The Map that Shows Why a Pipeline Explo-
sion in Turkey Matters to the U.S., BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2014), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-12-10/the-map-that-shows-why-a-pipeline-explo
sion-in-turkey-matters-to-the-u-s-.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2J67-NSLT].
2. Id.
3. Jordan Robertson & Michael Riley, Mysterious ’08 Turkey Pipeline Blast Opened
New Cyberwar, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-12-10/mysterious-08-turkey-pipeline-blast-opened-new-cyber
war.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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control center never detected the increase in pressure at any point
along the pipeline.7 The hackers triggered a massive explosion that
destroyed significant sections of the pipeline, spilled over thirty thou-
sand barrels of oil into an adjacent aquifer, inflicted five million dol-
lars a day in closure costs on BP, and caused a one-billion-dollar loss
for the Republic of Azerbaijan in export revenue.8 In the aftermath,
Turkish authorities claimed a system malfunction caused the blast,
and it was not until six years later that it was conclusively proven the
incident was a cyber act of terrorism.9 While much of the coverage of
the BTC pipeline event rightfully focused on whether the event was a
new cyber war or new front in international terrorism,10 the less obvi-
ous, but just as important, issue is: How should critical infrastructure
be designed in order to be protected in an interconnected and wireless
world?
The BTC pipeline incident is a clear example of the challenges
posed in a cyber-enabled world. This pipeline incident created signifi-
cant public health risks in the immediate explosion, accompanying oil
spill, contamination of an entire aquifer, substantial financial loss for
a private company, and potentially disastrous foreign policy implica-
tions for Turkey and Azerbaijan.11 The narrative of dark, shadowy
hackers just a click away from Armageddon, while sensational and
thrilling, makes it too easy for lawmakers and policy advocates to ig-
nore the most important message that should be gleaned from this
example and those like it: modern infrastructure is almost completely
reliant on computer systems and networks, fundamentally changing
how to prepare for and respond to catastrophes whether precipitated
by a terrorist event or a natural disaster.
Cybersecurity is not a topic that should be addressed in a vacuum.
Cyber is everything and everywhere in the modern world, but most
individuals still think about infrastructure in a pre-computer-
networked way.12 Take for example a large power outage that could be
caused by high temperatures, over use of electricity, or a squirrel
chewing through transmission lines.13 Prior to the advent of wide-
spread computer networks and Internet-enabled communications,
most businesses would have some sort of limited function without
power and could wait until power was restored, but not in today’s
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Foreign Policy’s The Editor’s Roundtable: Behind the Latest WikiLeaks Dump:
New News?, FOREIGN POL’Y MAG. (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter The Editor’s Round-
table Podcast] (downloaded using iTunes).
13. See GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN AMERICANS AND
OUR ENERGY FUTURE 190 (2016).
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world.14 The cyber-enabled economy is powered by companies like
Google, Apple, and Cisco that are entirely reliant on regular and con-
sistent provision of electricity for powering servers and computer net-
works for customers.15 A devastating real-world example was the
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina where overreliance on
modern communications infrastructure proved disastrous. The near
total collapse of landline, satellite, and cell-phone communications
made it practically impossible for local law enforcement and the Loui-
siana National Guard to coordinate response efforts.16 Cyber policy,
regulation, and infrastructure affect private companies; private indi-
viduals; and local, state, and federal governments, both individually
and collectively.17 The true question posed by events like the BTC at-
tack and the communication-infrastructure collapse during Hurricane
Katrina is how policymakers encourage resiliency and security in
cyber critical infrastructure and enable first responders to react
timely when that infrastructure is under threat.
The United States has wrestled with how to promote both the de-
velopment of cyberspace and maintain its security and redundancy for
nearly two decades.18 That tension, however, has largely missed the
forest for the trees. By defining cybersecurity as something reserved
to the national-security apparatus, key players in emergency manage-
ment and response have largely seen cyber as outside of their exper-
tise until the past several years.19 Despite this reliance, the policy and
legislative spheres suffer from tunnel vision and therefore largely only
focus on terrorism or bad-actor threats to network-enabled infrastruc-
ture.20 What is missed is the additional threat posed by simple human
error, natural disaster, and ad hoc integration of these systems.
In order to address the current gaps in cybersecurity legislation, it
is important to place the gaps and threats in context. Part II will ad-
dress the vulnerabilities of our cyber-physical systems and the threats
natural disasters and even simple human error pose to these systems.
These vulnerabilities are uniquely highlighted in two recent events:
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, in DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 101, 103 (3d ed.
2015).
17. Id.
18. See Peter Burnett, The Vital Role of Critical Information Infrastructure Protec-
tion (CIIP) in Cybersecurity, in REPORT ON CYBERSECURITY AND CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE IN THE AMERICAS 13, 14 (2015), https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-
content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/reports/critical-infrastructures-west-hemis
phere.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/L9VK-45FP].
19. PAUL STOCKTON, JOHNS HOPKINS APPLIED PHYSICS LAB., SUPERSTORM SANDY: IM-
PLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING A POST-CYBER ATTACK POWER RESTORATION SYSTEM 13
(2016).
20. The Editor’s Roundtable Podcast, supra note 12.
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(1) the wide-scale power outage and degraded communications during
Superstorm Sandy in 201221 and (2) the 2005 Taum Sauk Water Stor-
age Dam failure in eastern Missouri triggered by the transmission of
incorrect readings to an off-site monitoring-and-management facility
in the Lake of the Ozarks, Missouri.22 Each of these cases is sympto-
matic of three different types of cyber incidents that planners and
emergency-response professionals must prepare for: (1) degradation of
cyber infrastructure due to natural disaster, (2) human error in instal-
lation of infrastructure hardware, and (3) poor software design that
was not discovered until after the system failure. Part II argues Presi-
dent Obama’s Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) 21 and 41 on
United States Cyber Incident Coordination were good first steps to-
ward creating an emergency-response framework but insufficient to
push both states and private entities to develop truly resilient, redun-
dant, integrated cyber infrastructure.
Part III addresses these cyber-related challenges by redesigning
how the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act (Stafford Act) operates in an event involving cyber systems.23 The
Stafford Act should be amended to explicitly address the unique na-
ture of cyber-enabled critical infrastructure and give the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) authority to develop inter-
state emergency-response agreements explicitly identifying key cyber
critical infrastructure.24 Next, the FEMA Administrator, through her
review authority under 42 U.S.C. §§ 5196–96f, should promote the
creation of a three-tier incident-classification system for interstate
compacts: (1) localized harm or destruction to physical computer hard-
ware, (2) infected or destroyed network nodes that hinder or degrade
independent systems from communicating, and (3) software or com-
puter-logic degradation that effectively renders computer systems
useless.25 Finally, to ensure the widest compliance possible, the Ad-
ministrator should condition provision of any financial contributions
to the states on the acceptance of the three-tier system and the adop-
tion of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST)
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. This
21. David Talbot, As Sandy Bashes the Northeast, Emergency Communications Re-
main Flawed, MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com
/s/506596/as-sandy-bashes-the-northeast-emergency-communications-remain-fl
awed [https://perma.unl.edu/APB2-XM48].
22. KEITH STOUFFER, JOE FALCO & KAREN SCAREONE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS &
TECH., SPECIAL PUBL’N NO. 800-82, GUIDE TO INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS)
3–21 (2011).
23. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5121–5207 (2012).
24. Id.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 5196(h)(1) (2012) (charging the FEMA Administrator with creat-
ing a “program supporting the development of emergency preparedness compacts
for acts of terrorism, disasters, and emergencies”).
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requirement will incentivize states and private parties to better de-
velop resilient and redundant computer infrastructures within their
state as well as promote overall security through the interstate com-
pacts. Further, these interstate compacts can serve as effective ways
to assess state-level emergency response during an event and serve as
a component of the governor’s state-of-emergency declaration as pro-
scribed under the Stafford Act.26 This amendment should authorize
federal financial aid, in line with current cost-sharing arrangements
for states and private parties for emergency response, when state gov-
ernors and the President declare a disaster or emergency.27 This com-
bination of mandating a common vocabulary in classifying cyber
vulnerabilities within and across states in addition to financial incen-
tives for taking common-sense approaches to classifying the threat en-
vironment is a simple and effective way to better protect U.S. critical
infrastructure from accidents, terrorist threats, and natural disasters.
Part IV applies this revamped Stafford Act to a hypothetical hurricane
hitting Houston, Texas, to test the effectiveness of expanding FEMA’s
authority and responsibility for promoting cybersecurity in the face of
a natural disaster.
II. PLACING CYBERSECURITY IN THE CRITICAL-
INFRASTRUCTURE CONVERSATION
A. What Makes Cybersecurity Critical to Critical
Infrastructure?
Societies increasingly rely on computer technology and on net-
work-connected or Internet-based services and products. This is the
case for individuals, corporations, and the governmental entities that
provide critical infrastructure. Critical infrastructure is defined as the
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets
would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic secur-
ity, national public health or safety, or any combination of those mat-
ters.”28 President Barack Obama issued PPD 21 in 2013, which
identified sixteen key sectors he determined fell under the definition
of critical infrastructure.29 These sixteen sectors included communica-
tions, chemical, wastewater and treatment, energy, dams, emergency
26. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a) (2012).
27. See id.
28. Critical Infrastructure Act of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
29. Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,
WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PPD-21], https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-in
frastructure-security-and-resil [https://perma.unl.edu/JQ94-8379].
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services, information technology, transportation, and nuclear
energy.30
These sectors and industries have two distinct qualities they do not
share with other similarly sized industries: (1) widespread use and
reliance on industrial control systems (ICS) or supervisory-control-
and-data-acquisition (SCADA) systems and (2) the increasing use of
remote sensor management and control of these complex industrial
systems.31 Before the advent of networked computer systems, these
ICSs were manually operated and often worked using proprietary
computer software unique to that industry or to the particular com-
pany operating it.32 This practice meant relatively few engineers and
computer technicians would be familiar with the operating systems,
and there was no connection between one ICS and another.33 Today,
however, these systems are becoming more reliant on remote access,
which allows a small number of technicians to access off-site systems
and sensors spread out across a wide geographic area.34 To accom-
plish this, these systems are now being connected to the same Internet
communications software and systems that all other public, private,
and personal users operate.35
This means these once secure systems are now vulnerable to the
same malware, viruses, glitches, and poor programming the rest of the
Internet is vulnerable to.36 Further, all entities, including individuals,
corporations, and critical infrastructure, are becoming increasingly
detached from the systems and data on which they rely.37 Cyber-
security technologist Bruce Schneier argued this detachment is pri-
marily the result of the rise of cloud computing and that organizations
of all sizes are “progressively outsourcing much or even most of their
[information technology] infrastructure.”38 This means degradation in
one critical-infrastructure sector, communications or information
30. The full list of sectors is: chemical, commercial facilities, communications, critical
manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, energy, finan-
cial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public
health, information technology, nuclear facilities and waste, transportation sys-
tems, and water and wastewater treatment. Id.
31. Burnett, supra note 18, at 14.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 341, 348–49 (quoting Bruce Schneier, InfoQ, Keynote Address at
QCon (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.infoq.com/presentations/Schneier-security-key-
note-qcon [https://perma.unl.edu/7BWA-GLSP] (describing role of cloud
computing)).
38. Id.
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technology for example, can create a cascading failure across other
sectors like energy and wastewater treatment.
This interdependence between systems and industries is a hall-
mark of the contemporary just-in-time economy.39 The goal of the
just-in-time economy is for companies to reduce inventory and produce
goods and services as close to the time of demand as possible.40 This
formula, while efficient, is completely dependent on rapid and reliable
communications provided by the Internet and networked systems.41
Further, this drastic reduction in inventory and reliance on intercon-
nected critical infrastructure eliminated the buffers that would mini-
mize the effects of disaster-related supply-chain disruptions.42 The
interdependence seen today, where physical infrastructure is becom-
ing more reliant on cyber capabilities, is just the tip of the iceberg for
next-generation technologies in logistics, city planning, and infra-
structure build-outs. Municipalities around the globe are starting to
experiment with cyber-physical systems where autonomous machines
are communicating with each other and humans are less and less
involved.
One example [of a cyber-physical system] is “smart grid” technology, where
networked computers and communications technology would be used to work
autonomously to resolve problems in the electric grid, manage consumer elec-
tronic usage during peak and off-peak times, and administer energy produc-
tion. Cyber-physical systems may be incorporated into transportation
infrastructure (e.g. automated traffic control), water infrastructure (e.g.
“smart” water meters), and to monitor the structural health of all physical
infrastructure.43
The concept of cyber-physical systems may seem far-fetched, but take
a moment to think about next-generation technologies that fill today’s
news. A smart city would include a range of autonomous vehicles (in-
cluding passenger cars, semitrucks, trains, ships, and aircraft), micro-
energy grids utilizing solar and wind power through networked bat-
tery storage to power homes and businesses, advanced water and was-
tewater systems reliant on automated systems to manage use and
distribution to reduce waste, and smart homes designed to automate
mundane tasks like grocery shopping, laundry, and other domestic
work.44
39. Ryan, supra note 16, at 11.
40. Id.
41. Nicholas S. Kelley & Michael T. Osterholm, Pandemic Influenza, Electricity, and
the Coal Supply Chain: Addressing Crucial Preparedness Gaps in the United
States, in DISASTER LAW & POLICY 11, 11 (3d ed. 2015).
42. See id. at 11–12.
43. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INITIATIVE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: LONG-TERM TRENDS
AND DRIVERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 3 (2011),
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/programs/oppa/critical_infrastructure_paper.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/FML3-PBYU].
44. See OFFICE OF CYBER & INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., THE FUTURE OF SMART CITIES: CYBER-PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK 3
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This shift to automation pervades discussions of our cities and our
livelihoods. Although coverage of the 2016 U.S. presidential election
centered on the demise of manufacturing employment in the United
States and blamed it on free-trade agreements, most experts agree the
real culprit is automation.45 Most think automation only applies to
low-skill, manual-labor positions, but the real target of automation is
increasingly middle-class jobs. It is the “[r]outine jobs on the factory
floor or in payroll or accounting departments [that] tend to fall in be-
tween. And it’s these middle-class jobs that robots have the easiest
time [replacing].”46 Similarly, when someone thinks of emergency ser-
vices, they tend to think of 9-1-1, police officers, firefighters, or rescue
canines. In the next decade, a person is just as likely to reach an auto-
mated 9-1-1 service, be spotted by an autonomous search-and-rescue
drone, and be picked up by an autonomous ground-rescue vehicle dur-
ing an emergency.47 Thus, the ability of governments at the federal,
state, and local levels to respond to issues from the day-to-day work-
ings of their communities to wide-scale natural disasters is becoming
increasingly reliant on computer systems and autonomous processes
and devices. These systems provide significant benefits to society, but
it is important that elected officials and first responders—at all
levels—understand the risks associated with these systems.
The intent of this initial discussion is not to further cyber dooms-
day scenarios. Fear of cyber doomsday is often over exaggerated be-
cause writers tend focus on worst-case scenarios.48 Instead, the goal is
(2015), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCIA%20-%20
The%20Future%20of%20Smart%20Cities%20-%20Cyber-Physical%20Infrastruc
ture%20Risk.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/59DV-W7VP]; see also Kashmir Hill,
When “Smart Homes” Get Hacked: I Haunted A Complete Stranger’s House Via
the Internet, FORBES (July 26, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2013/07/26/smart-homes-hack/#363cbf06e426 [https://perma.unl.edu/9U78-
KPL3] (explaining the ability to control other people’s devices from afar without
their permission).
45. Elizabeth Kolbert, Our Automated Future: How Long Will It Be Before You Lose
Your Job to a Robot?, NEW YORKER (Dec. 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/maga
zine/2016/12/19/our-automated-future [https://perma.unl.edu/DZF9-FLEU].
46. Id.
47. Alex Brokaw, Autonomous Search-and-Rescue Drones Outperform Humans at
Navigating Forest Trails, VERGE (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/
2/11/10965414/autonomous-drones-deep-learning-navigation-mapping [https://
perma.unl.edu/5NMS-EBDL].
48. For example, see Sean Lawson, Does 2016 Mark the End of Cyber Pearl Harbor
Hysteria?, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2016/
12/07/does-2016-mark-the-end-of-cyber-pearl-harbor-hysteria/#5736bcaf22c2 [ht
tps://perma.unl.edu/B236-UWQE]; Robert McMillan & Jennifer Valentino-
Devries, Russian Hacks Show Cybersecurity Limits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-hacks-show-cybersecurity-limits-1478031
535. Both discuss how cybersecurity discussions are consumed by warnings that
states like Russia or China are on the verge of launching a complex cyber attack
on dams or the power grid, killing thousands. These warnings have not borne out
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to highlight how cyber technology has become woven into practically
every aspect of critical infrastructure and disaster response in order to
bring attention to the lack of any thoughtful incorporation of cyber-
security into disaster-response legislation. Before assessing the lim-
ited effectiveness of PPD-21, PPD-41, and the Stafford Act to manage
cyber emergency response, it is worth looking at two recent cases
highlighting why cybersecurity should be incorporated into federal-
and state-level emergency response. The cases include telecommuni-
cations-network degradation and destruction in contrast to the rela-
tively quick return of electricity and power in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy in 2012, and the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam failure near
Lesterville, Missouri, in 2005.
1. Superstorm Sandy
Superstorm Sandy was a late-season hurricane that began in the
southwest Caribbean on October 20, 2012, and proceeded to move
north across the Atlantic and batter the U.S. eastern seaboard.49 It
struck the New Jersey and New York coastlines with a catastrophic
storm surge causing 147 deaths and approximately fifty-two billion
dollars in damage.50 One of the immediate victims was the power grid
across both New York and New Jersey, leading to blackouts and re-
duced power output in several areas flooded due to the storm surge.51
These blackouts caused significant Internet and wireless-phone out-
ages due to the lack of backup generators for power distribution to
cable-television operators, wireless-phone operators, or even custom-
ers’ handheld devices.52
While the blackouts caused major disruption, the energy grid was
brought back online relatively quickly because responders were pre-
pared and energy blackouts were anticipated.53 Unlike the lack of re-
dundancy and planning by Internet providers in both cable and
telephone industries, the energy sector previously negotiated a num-
ber of mutual-assistance agreements that brought tens of thousands
of technicians and support personnel into the affected area to return
in reality and instead ignore more mundane cybersecurity issues like poor pro-
gramming, incompatibility of systems, and more general influence operations.
49. ERIC S. BLAKE ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: HURRI-
CANE SANDY 1–3 (2013), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL182012_Sandy.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/T6R7-DWQC].
50. Id.
51. ALEXIS KWASINSKI, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, HURRICANE SANDY EFFECTS ON COM-
MUNICATION SYSTEMS PRELIMINARY REPORT 2–4 (2012), http://users.ece.utexas.
edu/~kwasinski/preliminary%20telecom%20report%20v3%20comp.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/GK93-8DS3].
52. Id. at 4.
53. STOCKTON, supra note 19, at 2–3.
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energy service.54 In response to the growing number of natural disas-
ters, energy utilities proactively developed robust decision-making
frameworks and aid agreements for allocating and distributing per-
sonnel and capabilities to support utilities harmed by disaster.55 Prior
to Superstorm Sandy, energy utilities prepared for power loss due to
downed lines or inclement weather and developed clear plans and pro-
tocols to respond to those disasters, but there was no prepared re-
sponse for cyber degradation or significant loss of communication
networks.56
Further, energy production is a good example of a critical infra-
structure that is fundamentally changing with the adoption of cyber-
controlled and -enabled systems. This risk can best be categorized as a
hybrid risk where an attack or loss from a cyber event can cross over
into the physical realm.57 In 2016, over eighty percent of oil-and-gas-
industry companies experienced an increase in cyber attacks in addi-
tion to degraded performance from computer malfunctions or poor sys-
tem interoperability.58
The threats posed to these systems are rapidly increasing, and by
2018, “the oil and gas industry is expected to face up to $1.87 billion in
cybersecurity spending in an effort to protect against cyber risks.”59
As highlighted by Superstorm Sandy and its response, energy compa-
nies are prepared for natural disasters, but the mindset surrounding
cyber threats has been wrongfully narrowed to focus only on cyber-
criminal threats. Cyberspace must be seen as a new domain to pre-
pare for wherever the threat comes from. The World Energy Council’s
annual report emphasized the increased importance of cybersecurity.
It noted, “energy companies must get used to the fact that cyber is now
[the] same kind of risk to large infrastructure as a flood or fire.”60 Put
another way, critical infrastructure, especially the energy sector,
should not get caught up on whether to classify a cyber event as arson
or wildfire but plan and exercise how to put out the fire.
2. Failure of the Taum Sauk Water Storage Dam
The energy sector is uniquely interconnected with Internet and
computer systems due to computer infrastructures’ total reliance on
regular and steady electricity.61 The problem of inadequate focus on
54. Id. at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, THE ROAD TO RESILIENCE: MANAGING CYBER RISKS 4
(2016).
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id. at 10.
61. BAKKE, supra note 13, at 190.
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cybersecurity and overreliance on networking systems in emergency
response is just as relevant for other critical areas of infrastructure.
This point is clear when looking at the Taum Sauk Water Storage
Dam failure in central Missouri in 2005.
The Taum Sauk Reservoir Dam, from its inception in the 1950s,
was designed to be a completely autonomous dam that would be man-
aged and operated remotely from Bagnell Dam, located approximately
120 miles away.62 The Dam provided energy production for Amer-
enUE, a utility company, and was hailed as an engineering feat for
dam design and efficiency.63 In fact, AmerenUE employees were on
site at the Dam on September 26, 2005, for a ceremony with the Insti-
tute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), who declared the
facility an engineering milestone.64 It was at this ceremony employees
first noticed something was wrong.65 Company engineers noticed sig-
nificant amounts of water overtopping the reservoir, and after an ini-
tial inspection, realized the “fail-safe” water-level sensors in the
reservoir had come unattached.66 Company personnel reattached the
sensors inside the reservoir, and personnel at the site supposedly
reprogrammed the sensors to reduce the operating level to provide a
wider margin of safety.67 At this point, the company thought the issue
was fixed but never verified the entire sensor network in the reservoir
was synced to the same water level.68 On December 14, 2005, less
than three months after the repairs, a different set of reservoir sen-
sors failed to shut down the pumps feeding water into the reservoir,
and the “fail-safe” probes failed to activate because the water level ele-
vations were mischaracterized in the programming.69 The failure of
both sets of probes was not detected at the off-site operations center
because the computer software displaying the gauges to operators was
programmed with a different water cutoff level than the sensors, so
no alarms were raised for operators.70 In addition, the auto-safe
backup system failed to activate in time because the repairs done in
September were only completed on one set of probes and not the
other.71
62. J. David Rogers, Conor M. Watkins & Jae-Won Chung, The 2005 Upper Taum
Sauk Dam Failure: A Case History, XVI  ENVTL. & ENGINEERING GEOSCIENCE 257,
262 (Aug. 2010).
63. Id. at 268.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 269.
70. Id. at 285.
71. Id.
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The overflow became catastrophic for dam structural integrity as
the overflowing water landed into a rock-and-dirt berm immediately
below the reservoir and eroded it to the point of total collapse.72 The
collapse led to over one billion gallons of water being released in Prof-
fitt Mountain, destroying a state park superintendent’s home and se-
riously injuring the family.73 Multiple investigations ensued,
including one by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
and each investigation determined a number of factors contributed to
the failure.74 During the investigations, it became clear a number of
failures led to the dam overflow, but the worst was that AmerenUE
had “no formalized oversight to oversee modifications to the reser-
voir’s instrumentation.”75 Further, the company became too reliant on
the networked systems, and a lack of visual oversight on the water
levels meant that no human operator actually verified water levels,
even after the initial overflow in September 2005.76 Finally, investiga-
tors found the software system itself was never programmed to report
or flag abnormal water-flow rates to plant operators, but the operators
assumed the computer readings incorporated an adequate margin of
error to trigger the auto “fail-safe” system.77
The Taum Sauk Dam failure highlights two central points key to
this discussion. First, modern-day computer systems are evolutionary
and are never in a complete state. Every computer or smartphone user
is faced with the constant need to update apps and software to have
the latest version that incorporates bug fixes or security patches. The
same is true for the ICS and SCADA systems, which are used in criti-
cal infrastructure.78 Many operators and users of these systems are
not well versed on the network capabilities of these devices, how they
interact with other SCADA or ICS systems, or the simple fact that
these systems are oftentimes connected to the worldwide Internet.79
This lack of understanding may not expose itself during regular opera-
tions but rather prove catastrophic when these networked elements
fail during an event like the one at Taum Sauk. There was no process
for ensuring that different network components and sensors operated
72. Rudi Keller, Taum Sauk Levee Breaks, SE. MISSOURIAN (Dec. 15, 2005), http://
www.semissourian.com/story/1131499.html [https://perma.unl.edu/RMG7-5JXY].
73. Id.; see also STOUFFER ET AL., supra note 22, at C-13 (summarizing the Taum
Sauk Water Storage Dam failure).
74. FED. ENERGY REGULATION COMM’N, FERC NO. 2277, REPORT OF FINDINGS ON THE
OVERTOPPING AND EMBANKMENT BREACH OF THE UPPER DAM—TAUM SAUK
PUMPED STORAGE PROJECT 7–8 (2006).
75. Rogers et al., supra note 62, at 285.
76. Id. at 286.
77. Id.
78. Kim Zetter, 10K Reasons to Worry About Critical Infrastructure, WIRED (Jan. 24,
2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/01/10000-control-systems-online [https://
perma.unl.edu/73ZL-D4KU].
79. Id.
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in concert with the plant control systems at Taum Sauk.80 The “fail-
safe” mechanisms were subject to the same automation failures and
risks as the primary sensors; thus, the staff did not fully appreciate
the risk posed by the limitations of the technology.
The second lesson from the Taum Sauk failure is the dichotomy
between natural disasters and man-made disasters is becoming less
relevant in today’s technologically driven world. Taum Sauk served as
a technological marvel in engineering and was designed to be a nearly
autonomous system.81 The ensuing flood and destruction, while a nat-
ural occurrence, was precipitated by human error. Thus, attempts to
separate natural disasters from man-made disasters, like under the
Stafford Act,82 are inherently lacking in today’s interconnected world
because “no disaster is completely ‘natural;’ human exposure and vul-
nerability to risk is a product of cultural patterns influenced heavily
by law.”83
B. PPD-21 and Recognition of Cyber in Critical
Infrastructure
In order to understand why FEMA, the key federal organization
responsible for emergency response, has not taken a more proactive
role in cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, it is important to un-
derstand the cybersecurity landscape from 2013 to present day. In
2013, President Obama issued PPD-21.84 PPD-21’s stated goal was to
create a national unity of effort “to strengthen and maintain secure,
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure.”85 PPD-21 was not
the Federal Government’s first attempt to get a handle on critical in-
frastructure and the need for cybersecurity to be incorporated into the
broader discussion.86 Over a two-year period, Congress attempted and
failed to pass the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, an Act designed to set
cybersecurity baselines in response to an uptick in reported cyber at-
tacks on oil-and-gas-pipeline infrastructure.87 This proposed Act, al-
though passing the House of Representatives, floundered in the
Senate because of too many competing interests and more headline-
grabbing topics at the time including national debt, sequestration, and
80. Rogers et al., supra note 62, at 285.
81. Id. at 262.
82. See 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2012).
83. Ryan, supra note 16, at 9.
84. PPD-21, supra note 29.
85. Id.; see also Deborah Norris Rodin, Note, The Cybersecurity Partnership: A Propo-
sal for Cyberthreat Information Sharing Between Contractors and the Federal
Government, 44 PUB. CONT. L.J. 505, 516–17 (2015) (explaining the purpose of
PPD-21).
86. Hillary Hellmann, Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United States Pipeline
SCADA Systems, 36 ENERGY L.J. 157, 167 (2015).
87. Id.
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tax-cut extensions.88 The competing interests included discussions of
whether the Act should cover “information sharing, critical infrastruc-
ture regulatory structures, [and] workforce challenges” in cyber-
security.89 With the failure of the Cybersecurity Act, the Executive
Branch was left with few options to expand cybersecurity.90 In order
to provide some guidance in the ensuing loss of the Cybersecurity Act,
PPD-21, in combination with Executive Order 13,636, took the discus-
sion of cybersecurity out of an attack framework and instead argued
the Federal Government must take steps to address cyber threats.91
Although subtle, PPD-21 went further than the defunct Cybersecurity
Act by taking cybersecurity out of the national-security box and tying
the resiliency of physical infrastructure to the resiliency of the cyber
infrastructure.92 Because “[j]ust as the physical and cyber elements of
critical infrastructure are inextricably linked, so are the
vulnerabilities.”93
The connection between the two was reflected in PPD-21 through
President Obama’s order directing all federal departments and agen-
cies to create a number of joint operational centers, reporting mecha-
nisms, and information-sharing protocols to ensure unity of effort to
maintain a robust and functioning critical infrastructure in the face of
a disaster or emergency.94 The central purpose of PPD-21 was to pro-
vide federal support and attention to key critical-infrastructure com-
ponents but not management or oversight.95 This attention was also
highlighted in Executive Order 13,636 because it called for the Secre-
tary of the Department of Commerce to order NIST to develop a volun-
tary information-sharing program to promote coordination but not
require adoption of any security mechanisms.96 Further, PPD-21 at-
tempted to connect critical infrastructure regulated by sector-specific
agencies (SSAs) and provide a forum for expanded public–private
88. Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, July Fireworks: Senate May Take Up Cybersecurity,
But Then What?, NEXTGOV (June 25, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/cyberse
curity/cybersecurity-report/2012/06/july-fireworks-senate-may-take-cybersecur
ity-then-what/56448/?oref=NG-channelriver [https://perma.unl.edu/ZKT7-
VZZW].
89. Id.
90. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 167.
91. PPD-21, supra note 29; see also Exec. Order No. 13,636, 3 C.F.R. § 101 (2014)
(“The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one
of the most serious national security challenges we confront.”).
92. PPD-21, supra note 29.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Paul Rosenzweig, No, DHS Is Not Going to “Take Over” the Electoral System,
LAWFARE BLOG (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/no-dhs-not-going-
take-over-electoral-system [https://perma.unl.edu/72GZ-TFTG].
96. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 167.
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partnerships with other sectors and their regulators.97 This last com-
ponent is key because, as seen in the response to Superstorm Sandy
and the Taum Sauk Dam failure, critical infrastructure is networked
and interdependent in ways not seen before.98 Thus, a common ver-
nacular and approach to protecting critical infrastructure is crucial.
There are two key issues, however, with PPD-21 that required the is-
suance of PPD-41. First, PPD-21 attempted to address cybersecurity
through its employment in critical infrastructure but failed to address
the unique qualities of cybersecurity within critical infrastructure.
Second, PPD-21 placed the impetus on federal agencies but largely
missed the role that local and state governments and private parties
play in the protection of critical infrastructure. It was these gaps, and
the broader lack of cybersecurity oversight, that led to the issuance of
PPD-41 in mid-2016.
C. PPD-41: Cybersecurity Has Its Day
PPD-41—United States Cyber Incident Coordination—is the most
comprehensive “whole of government” approach to cybersecurity to
date and was designed to provide a framework for federal-government
responses to cyber incidents by clearly delineating the role of federal,
state, and local governments.99 Building off PPD-21, PPD-41 places
the responsibility of cybersecurity on all parties, both public and
private.
The nature of cyberspace requires individuals, organizations, and the govern-
ment to all play roles in incident response. . . . [E]ffective incident response
efforts will help support an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable informa-
tion and communications infrastructure that promotes trade and commerce,
strengthens international security, fosters free expression, and reinforces the
privacy and security of our citizens.100
This collaborative approach is vital because, as demonstrated in
Superstorm Sandy, critical industries are often completely reliant on
the ability of state and local governments to quickly respond, while
government at all levels is equally reliant on private-sector infrastruc-
ture.101 The most important role of PPD-41 is that it clearly articu-
lates cybersecurity is about much more than deterring bad actors and
explains cyber infrastructure is “vulnerable to malicious activity, mal-
97. Id. at 166–67. A common example of an SSA is the Department of Energy’s over-
sight authority over public utilities.
98. Trautman, supra note 37, at 368.
99. Sean D. Carberry, Why PPD-41 Is Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary, FCW (Oct.
24, 2016), https://fcw.com/articles/2016/10/24/ppd41-cyber-carberry.aspx [https://
perma.unl.edu/CB23-SFD9].
100. Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordination, WHITE
HOUSE (July 26, 2016) [hereinafter PPD-41], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-cyber-
incident [https://perma.unl.edu/28QK-NJDZ].
101. WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 57, at 10.
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function, human error, and acts of nature, placing the Nation and its
people at risk.”102 This articulation of the vulnerability in cyber is key
because it highlights the multifaceted approach necessary in order to
respond to a cyber incident. Unlike PPD-21, PPD-41 directly ad-
dresses the fundamental challenges posed by cybersecurity and ex-
pands the ecosystem from just critical infrastructure to the role cyber
increasingly plays in modern democracy.103
Under PPD-41, the expanded view of the cyber ecosystem is guided
by five principles for incident response: (1) shared responsibility, (2)
risk-based response, (3) respect for affected entities, (4) unity of gov-
ernmental effort, and (5) enablement of restoration and recovery.104
At the core, these principles attempt to streamline a response to a
cyber incident and communicate to state and local authorities, as well
as private-sector parties, that the federal government will provide
support in response to a cyber incident. PPD-41 defines a cyber inci-
dent as “an event occurring on or conducted through a computer net-
work that actually or imminently jeopardizes the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of computers, information or communi-
cations systems or networks, physical or virtual infrastructure con-
trolled by computers or information systems, or information resident
thereon.”105 The event does not need to be perpetrated by a malicious
actor and includes not only the event that occurs but also includes any
vulnerabilities in those systems that “could be exploited by a threat
source.”106 Further, PPD-41 distinguishes between a standard cyber
incident and a significant cyber incident. A significant cyber incident
is an incident that is “likely to result in demonstrable harm to the
national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the United
States or to the . . . public health and safety of the American peo-
ple.”107 For the purpose of this discussion, the focus is centered on the
more egregious significant cyber incident. The shutdown of critical-
infrastructure components or systems is much more likely to rise to
the level of a significant cyber incident than theft of company or client
data or software glitches in non-critical-infrastructure industries.
In order to respond to a significant cyber incident, PPD-41 directs
three concurrent lines of effort: (1) threat response, (2) asset response,
and (3) intelligence support.108 Threat response includes activities re-
lated to criminal or forensic investigation aimed at identifying the
threat and the attacker, if there is an attacker; potentially linking re-
102. PPD-41, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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lated threats; and mitigating the immediate threat to any network or
system.109 Through asset response, federal agencies can provide tech-
nical assistance to victims of a cyber incident to “stop the bleeding,”
mitigate vulnerabilities, protect victims’ network assets, and pass this
information on to other potential victims in hopes of stopping wider
damage or preventing a cascading effect from the threat.110 Finally,
intelligence support is a synchronization between federal agencies, lo-
cal authorities, and private parties to look at threat trends and pro-
mote sharing of intelligence to identify knowledge gaps in industries
in order to degrade or limit future threats.111
After defining the principles and threats for federal agencies, PPD-
41 explains how the Federal Government will conduct its three lines of
effort. PPD-41 creates a cyber unified coordination group (UCG) that
serves as the focal point for coordinating federal agencies. The UCG
would be activated at the request of the National Security Council
(NSC) or at the request of two or more federal agencies including
SSAs.112 Further, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) could
call for the UCG when a significant cyber incident affects critical in-
frastructure “for which a cyber incident could reasonably result in cat-
astrophic regional or national effects on public health or safety,
economic security, or national security.”113 It is the UCG that would
serve as the primary federal-response entity in the event of an inci-
dent and is designed to promote unity of effort in the federal response.
However, the UCG would not be the lead entity;114 each line of effort
has a different lead agency. The Department of Justice (DoJ) would
lead the threat-response effort, DHS would lead the asset-response ef-
fort, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
would lead the intelligence support.115
PPD-41, at its core, attempts to wrestle cybersecurity into some
sort of workable framework for coordination and oversight, and seat it
in the traditional national-preparedness framework.116 It is useful be-
cause it defines the problem and provides a context and structure to
harness federal support.117 PPD-41, like many PPDs, is only of lim-
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (discussing SSA list pulled directly from the critical-infrastructure designa-
tion under PPD-21).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Frank J. Cilluffo & Sharon L. Cardash, Overview and Analysis of PPD-41: US
Cyber Incident Coordination, LAWFARE BLOG (July 27, 2016), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/overview-and-analysis-ppd-41-us-cyber-incident-coordination [https://
perma.unl.edu/HFA4-PQWV].
2017] NETWORKING EMERGENCY RESPONSE 527
ited use because it lacks any legal authority or financial support to
turn the theoretical frameworks into practical responses.118
There are four key gaps in PPD-41 that necessitate an expanded
role for FEMA in cybersecurity response. First, PPD-41’s definition of
a “significant cyber incident” is inadequate to reasonably be able to
categorize the harms caused by a particular cyber incident.119 In the
world of cyber intrusions and malware, something as minor as hack-
ing a single Gmail account has huge repercussions because of the ac-
count owner’s identity,120 while a software glitch that temporarily
took Amazon Cloud servers offline along the entire East Coast for sev-
eral hours was largely fixed and forgotten the next day.121
Second, PPD-41 directs a federal structural response but does not
provide state or local governments any direction or advice on how to
utilize that system. PPD-41 attempts to place the UCG within the Na-
tional Incident Management System that relies on state-level agencies
to coordinate with federal authorities to monitor events to determine
the right level of response.122 However, these coordination centers or
fusion cells are not predictable and suffer from competing interests
and manpower issues, and therefore are not reliable in every emer-
gency.123 Further, state agencies are often ill-equipped to correctly
classify a cyber incident and suffer from a lack of cyber expertise to
quickly and efficiently report incidents to federal authorities.124 Fur-
ther, with the limited guidance on categorizing the severity of a cyber
incident, local and state authorities are prone to confusion on what
incidents will warrant federal assistance.125 In addition, FEMA’s in-
clusion in PPD-41 is limited to incorporating the PPD-41 policy into
118. HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE 98-611, PRESIDENTIAL
DIRECTIVES: BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW CRS-2 (2008) (providing review of dif-
ferent presidential directives, orders, and statements, and laying out the legal
authority of each).
119. See PPD-41, supra note 100.
120. Gregory Krieg & Tal Kopan, Is This the Email that Hacked John Podesta’s Ac-
count?, CNN (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/28/politics/phishing-
email-hack-john-podesta-hillary-clinton-wikileaks [https://perma.unl.edu/ZGH5-
H23W].
121. Alex Hern, How Did an Amazon Glitch Leave People Literally in the Dark?,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/01/
amazon-web-services-outage-smart-homes [https://perma.unl.edu/UA5A-
WWNR].
122. PPD-41, supra note 100.
123. Brian Nussbaum, Assistant Professor, State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, Address at
University of Nebraska College of Law State, Local and Regional Issues in Cyber-
security Conference (Mar. 17, 2017).
124. Id.
125. Id.
528 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:509
its Unified Coordination training but makes no mention of assisting in
state- or local-level plan development.126
Third, PPD-41 makes no mention of developing a framework for
public–private partnerships in order to conduct cyber-incident exer-
cises or security frameworks.127 This is especially important in the
critical-infrastructure context because upwards of eighty-five percent
of critical infrastructure is owned by private entities.128 While it is
vital the federal government be involved with cybersecurity, it is im-
portant private entities are just as capable and nimble in this
realm.129
Finally, PPDs are not federal regulations or statutory law and
carry no binding authority for successive administrations, so any
gains created in PPD-41 can be easily lost or rewritten under succes-
sive administrations.130 This is the most poignant point regarding
PPD-41’s future and its usefulness in responding to a cyber incident.
President Obama issued PPD-41 approximately six months prior to
leaving office, and ironically, issued the directive four days after the
first WikiLeaks publication of sensitive Democratic National Commit-
tee emails, arguably as part of a Russian intelligence campaign to in-
fluence the 2016 U.S. Presidential election.131 The investigation into
the alleged Russian hacking campaign continues as of this writing,
but it highlights a significant cyber incident need not destroy dams or
cause blackouts to threaten national security or public confidence in
the U.S. government. As Cilluffo and Cardash highlight, the true test
of PPD-41 is “the manner and nature of its implementation. Were the
United States to experience a cyber-attack on its grid . . . the Directive
would surely be triggered and tested. Whether and how the country
will respond to the DNC hack, however, remains an open question.”132
As of this writing, PPD-41 has not been triggered or utilized to re-
spond to the DNC hack or any cyber event. PPD-41 is not a binding
legal authority,133 and it is unclear so early in the Trump Administra-
126. Annex to Presidential Policy Directive—United States Cyber Incident Coordina-
tion, WHITE HOUSE (July 26, 2016) [hereinafter PPD-41 Annex], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/26/annex-presidential-
policy-directive-united-states-cyber-incident [https://perma.unl.edu/A8KR-
D5G7].
127. Carberry, supra note 99.
128. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INITIATIVE, supra note 43, at 2.
129. Cilluffo & Cardash, supra note 117.
130. RELYEA, supra note 118.
131. Justin Fishel & Veronica Stracqualursi, A Timeline of Russia’s Hacking into US
Political Organizations Before the Election, ABC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2016), http://abc
news.go.com/Politics/timeline-russias-hacking-us-political-organizations-ahead-
election/story?id=44140526 [https://perma.unl.edu/Z5XC-YH74].
132. Cilluffo & Cardash, supra note 117.
133. RELYEA, supra note 118.
2017] NETWORKING EMERGENCY RESPONSE 529
tion as to whether President Trump will maintain the two PPDs or
look to change the structure during his tenure.
After reviewing PPD-21 and PPD-41, it is clear the federal govern-
ment has made significant strides in promoting cybersecurity in emer-
gency response. However, what is also clear is that it has not done
enough to empower state and local authorities or private entities to
take a more proactive role in cybersecurity. The best option to fill this
gap is to utilize the United States’ primary emergency-response stat-
ute, the Stafford Act, to empower FEMA to be more involved in coordi-
nation for emergency response during a cyber incident. Further,
FEMA, partnered with any relevant SSA, should be given expanded
authority to provide tools and potential funding to the parties to incor-
porate preemptive cybersecurity in their emergency-response
preparedness.
III. EMPOWERING FEMA IN THE AGE OF CYBERSECURITY
A. The Stafford Act in Practice
  The Stafford Act is the principle federal emergency-response statute
in the United States.134 The Act, administered by FEMA, has a num-
ber of specific purposes, including the creation of a disaster- or emer-
gency-declaration process, oversight mechanisms during an
emergency response, and a system to distribute aid during such disas-
ter or emergency.135 While a powerful tool for the Executive Branch,
the scope of the Stafford Act is narrow, and the key “provisions are
triggered only by severe, natural, or manmade disasters that exhaust
local and state resources.”136 The Stafford Act attempts to strike a
balance between honoring states’ prerogatives in addressing local and
state events, and providing a federal coordination scheme when emer-
gency events are too severe for local or state authorities to handle.137
The Stafford Act creates two categories of events where a President
can provide federal support during an event: a major disaster or an
emergency. A “major disaster” is defined as:
any natural catastrophe . . . or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explo-
sion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the Presi-
dent causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under [the Stafford Act] to supplement the efforts and
available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organiza-
tions in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused
thereby.138
134. Gregory J. Lake, Federal & State Disaster Response: An Introduction, 41 COLO.
LAW. 95 (2012).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2012).
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An “emergency” is defined as:
any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Fed-
eral assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabili-
ties to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to
lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.139
The importance of these definitions is the President is not authorized
to provide federal support without a declaration that either a major
disaster or emergency occurred.140 The process for both declarations is
the governor of the affected state must submit a request for federal
support by declaring either a natural disaster or emergency exists and
the event is “of such severity and magnitude that an effective response
is beyond the capabilities of the state and the affected local govern-
ments.”141 The President does have the authority under § 5191(b) to
unilaterally declare a state of emergency.142 However, for the pur-
poses of this discussion the focus is on when the requests come from
the state level. An additional prerequisite of this requirement is the
governor must have directed and taken any necessary steps to execute
the state’s emergency plan.143 Each state must have an emergency
plan, and under § 201(a)–(d), the President must provide state agen-
cies technical assistance in “developing comprehensive plans and
practicable programs for preparation against disasters, including haz-
ard reduction, avoidance, and mitigation.”144 In addition, the Presi-
dent shall also provide similar assistance to individuals, private
businesses, and local governments following a disaster and in recovery
efforts.145
Once this process is complete, the President, through any applica-
ble federal agency, is then authorized to provide disaster relief.146 An
important caveat is that even if a Presidential declaration is issued,
federal agencies are not required to provide aid. Thus, there is no pro-
cess for funds or support to be automatically disbursed to any state
agency or other party eligible for relief.147 Further, private businesses
or other for-profit organizations are generally considered ineligible for
any type of assistance under the Stafford Act.148 This prevents private
businesses that provide resources, equipment, and personnel in re-
139. § 5122(1).
140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170(a), 5191(a) (2012).
141. §§ 5170(a), 5191(a).
142. § 5191(b).
143. §§ 5170(a), 5191(a).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a)–(d) (2012).
145. Id.
146. Lake, supra note 134, at 95.
147. Id.
148. Ernest B. Abbott, Recent Developments in Homeland Security and Emergency
Management: Representing Local Governments in Catastrophic Events: DHS/
FEMA Response and Recovery Issues, 37 URB. LAW. 467, 475 (2005).
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sponse to a federal disaster from being reimbursed under the Stafford
Act public-assistance program.149
B. The Stafford Act’s Current Approach to Cybersecurity
With a broad understanding of the Stafford Act and its coordinat-
ing role for declared natural disasters or emergencies, How does the
Stafford Act approach cybersecurity in emergency management and
preparedness? Like PPD-21, which fails to address the unique quali-
ties of cybersecurity that converge multiple infrastructures and net-
works, the Stafford Act misses the opportunity to push for cyber
resiliency in emergency planning. The Stafford Act only mentions
cybersecurity or cyber infrastructure twice in the entire Act, and both
references recognize that critical infrastructure includes both the
physical components of infrastructure as well as the cyber compo-
nents.150 No explicit tasks are assigned to FEMA other than assisting
in “[m]odeling, simulation, and analysis of the systems comprising
critical infrastructures, including cyber infrastructure . . . in order to
enhance understanding of the large-scale complexity of such sys-
tems.”151 This general inclusion of cyber infrastructure in the broader
context of critical-infrastructure protection is similar to the model
used in PPD-21.152 Any further guidance, however, is missing under
44 C.F.R. § 1, “Emergency Management and Assistance,” which does
not provide any significant mention of cybersecurity or FEMA-promul-
gated regulations regarding cybersecurity preparation or planning.153
Without any specific mention of cybersecurity under the Stafford Act
or implementing regulations, the question is whether a cyber event
would meet the definition of either a major disaster or emergency
under the Stafford Act. Under the current Stafford Act definition of
major disaster, a cyber incident would likely not meet the criteria be-
cause a cyber incident would not meet the examples of a natural catas-
trophe and not all cyber incidents would necessarily cause fire, flood,
or explosion.154 It is true, some cyber threats are explicitly intended to
cause a hazard leading to a fire, flood, or explosion and may fit under
this definition; however, cyber threats resulting in loss of communica-
tion networks or power generation would not meet this standard.
149. Id.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 5195(c)–(d) (2012).
151. § 5195(d).
152. PPD-21, supra note 29.
153. Emergency Management and Assistance, 44 C.F.R. § 1 (2016).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2) (2012) (enumerating several examples of “natural catastro-
phes,” including: hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal
wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm,
or drought).
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In drafting both the current Stafford Act and Critical Infrastruc-
tures Protection Act of 2001, Congress directed FEMA to take an all-
hazards approach to preparedness and emergency response but never
explicitly identified cybersecurity as a focus.155 Under the current
phrasing of the Stafford Act and the uncertain future of PPD-41, it is
unclear whether FEMA “should develop cyber capabilities to actively
mitigate cyber threats . . . so public-private risk-management pro-
grams are conducted fluidly by a single government entity” or whether
FEMA should defer all cybersecurity planning to its parent agency,
DHS.156
C. Modernizing FEMA and the Stafford Act for a Networked
World
After reviewing both the Stafford Act and the Code of Federal Reg-
ulations for “Emergency Management and Assistance,”157 it is clear
FEMA is not equipped with the tools necessary to fulfill its statutory
obligations to lead and support the United States in a “comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation.”158 There are three key tools that if adopted
would empower FEMA to take a proactive and unifying role in cyber-
security for critical infrastructure. First, the FEMA Administrator
under its rulemaking authority under 42 U.S.C. § 5197(g) should cre-
ate a classification of three types of cyber events under the broad defi-
nition of cyber incident provided under PPD-41, including: (1)
physical-system hardware destruction or loss, (2) network degradation
or destruction, and (3) software malfunction or exploitation inci-
dent.159 Second, the FEMA Administrator should provide financial
aid through the form of grants under FEMA’s emergency-prepared-
ness-compact authority160 to promote and streamline the adoption of
the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber-
security161 in each state’s emergency-preparedness compact estab-
lished by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA)
through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).162
155. David G. Delaney, Cybersecurity and the Administrative National Security State:
Framing the Issues for Federal Legislation, 40 J. LEGIS. 251, 273–74 (2014).
156. Id. at 275.
157. 44 C.F.R. § 302 (2016).
158. Delaney, supra note 155, at 274–75.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 5197(g) (2012).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 5196(h) (2012).
161. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRA-
STRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK],
https://www.nist.gov/document/draft-cybersecurity-framework-v11pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/7EJX-HJUV].
162. NAT’L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, THE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COM-
PACT: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL MUTUAL AID POL-
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Third, the President, through FEMA, should condition any post-cyber-
incident disaster-relief aid on a showing by the governor that all state
agencies and private partners adopted and implemented the NIST
Framework prior to the event.
1. Putting Cyber Incidents in Context by Defining the Incident
As discussed earlier, one of the shortcomings of PPD-41 is its fail-
ure to define types of cyber incidents.163 A working vernacular that is
incorporated at both the federal and state emergency-response levels
is vital to ensuring a timely response to events but is something that
is still lacking in cybersecurity. According to the Government Account-
ability Office’s (GAO) Critical Infrastructure Protection report, “There
are too many government agencies with different cyber-missions
working independently, with project duplication to the point that it is
not uncommon for several different groups to be working on the same
thing.”164 FEMA’s primary role is coordinating and synchronizing
emergency response; thus, FEMA should issue an incident-classifica-
tion guide enabling first responders to better understand the problem.
Three types of incident classification would help to place a cyber
incident in context: (1) physical-system hardware destruction or loss,
(2) network degradation or destruction, and (3) software malfunction
or exploitation incident. The first classification would cover physical-
system hardware destruction or loss. This can be caused by noncyber
means like flooding and fire or by cyber intrusion or accident.165 In
these types of incidents, emergency responders can prioritize sourc-
ing-replacement systems for distribution and utilize the state emer-
gency compacts to procure temporary or replacement hardware or
assistance for critical infrastructure.166
ICY AND OPERATIONS 1 (2014) [hereinafter EMAC], https://www.desmogblog.com/
sites/beta.desmogblog.com/files/EMAC%20History.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
Z6TD-BFLB] (explaining Congress created the EMAC structure in 1996 as a na-
tional, interstate mutual-aid agreement that empowered FEMA to assist states
through the NEMA nonprofit organization in developing emergency-response ca-
pabilities by encouraging states to adopt common vernacular, emergency-man-
agement structures, and emergency frameworks).
163. PPD-41, supra note 100.
164. Robert Kenneth Palmer, Critical Infrastructure: Legislative Factors for Prevent-
ing a “Cyber-Pearl Harbor”, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 289, 329 (2014) (citing U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-628, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTEC-
TION: KEY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CYBER EXPECTATIONS NEED TO BE CONSISTENTLY
ADDRESSED 14 (2010)).
165. Talbot, supra note 21. Mr. Talbot finds that the physical location of network in-
frastructure can often determine its survivability during a crisis: “[D]uring [Hur-
ricane] Katrina . . . although one carrier had built a very robust cellular tower
above the water line, the cable connecting that tower to the central office was
underwater and out of service.” Id.
166. EMAC, supra note 162, at 45.
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Second, network-degradation incidents are those where the indi-
vidual systems used by critical sectors are not damaged or otherwise
inoperable but instead the communications infrastructure is offline or
experiencing intermittent connectivity. As highlighted earlier, the
hallmark of modern technology is the expansion of interdependent
systems that communicate and operate together autonomously and
across a wide geographic area.167 These incidents are prone to inter-
state coordination because network towers or transmission points may
be across county or state lines, thus necessitating rapid communica-
tions between multiple parties to avoid cascading failures.168
Third, software malfunction or exploitation is the most common
classification seen today.169 This is a malfunction that degrades or
compromises a single computer system or network without any physi-
cal damage or loss.170 This is the typical software glitch that affects
one system and requires patching or other minor steps to correct.171
Despite being typical, these incidents can have a dramatic effect on
critical infrastructure, as demonstrated in the Amazon glitch that se-
verely limited access across the East Coast of the United States for
several hours.172 The third category also includes malicious malware
or hacking that targets systems for exploitation or espionage. While
not typically thought of as an emergency-management concern, this
category can be used to quickly classify a cyber incident for notifica-
tion to local, state, and federal law enforcement.
2. Developing Cyber-Emergency-Preparedness Pacts Through
FEMA Grant Funding
Including FEMA in cybersecurity and critical-infrastructure devel-
opment is important because FEMA’s central role is to be the coordi-
nation agency for the whole government.173 Unlike the Department of
167. James E. Scheuermann, Cyber-Physical Attacks on Critical Infrastructure:
What’s Keeping Your Insurer Awake at Night?, K&L GATES (Jan. 24, 2017) (citing
LLOYD’S, BUSINESS BLACKOUT: THE INSURANCE IMPLICATIONS OF A CYBER ATTACK
ON THE US POWER GRID (2015)), http://www.klgates.com/cyber-physical-attacks-
on-critical-infrastructure—whats-keeping-your-insurer-awake-at-night-01-24-20
17/#_ftn12  [https://perma.unl.edu/X2GP-KZ7U].
168. STOCKTON, supra note 19, at 13.
169. Sabine Vollmer, How to Protect Against the 9 Most Common Cyber-Attacks,
CGMA MAG. (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.cgma.org/magazine/2015/jan/20151162
4.html [https://perma.unl.edu/7N2A-FD7C]. Ms. Vollmer identifies the nine
“most common cyber-attacks,” and seven of the nine are related to software mal-
functions or deliberate hacks targeting software vulnerabilities. Id.
170. See id.
171. Hern, supra note 121.
172. Id.
173. David M. Crane, A National Imperative Americans Want to Serve: The Public
Assistance Service Responding to America’s Man-Made or Natural Disasters, 65
SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 260 (2015).
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Energy (DoE), the Department of Treasury, or the Department of Ag-
riculture, FEMA is not identified as the designated sector-specific
agency for any of the critical-infrastructure sectors.174 Instead,
FEMA’s primary function is “to direct assistance from Federal Gov-
ernment agencies that facilitate preparation, prevention, response
and recovery.”175 Under 42 U.S.C. § 5131, the President “shall provide
technical assistance to the States in developing comprehensive plans
and practicable programs for preparation against disasters, including
hazard reduction, avoidance, and mitigation.”176 In the cybersecurity
context, FEMA can utilize its statutory authority to drive expertise
and coordination to the state and local level through the EMAC.177 It
is important to note that when these events occur, it is the local first
responders who are often faced with the most challenging aspects of
response.178 State agencies in particular play a vital role in coordinat-
ing efforts between federal and local authorities because it is state
agencies that “formulate policy, coordinate the delivery of federal as-
sistance, and engage in . . . pre- and post-disaster capacity-building
initiatives that target local governments.”179 Thus, the key is provid-
ing FEMA a cyber coordination role to empower state agencies to coop-
erate and develop plans to implement at the local level.
To truly be effective, FEMA cannot only provide coordination but
must also provide certain levels of funding to drive the parties to pri-
oritize cybersecurity. Under 42 U.S.C. § 5131(d), FEMA is authorized
to create grants for no more than fifty percent of the cost of “improv-
ing, maintaining, and updating State disaster assistance plans.”180
Further, § 5131(d) grants FEMA the authority to recommend and
push standardization protocols in addition to funding authority to per-
suade states to adopt those protocols.181 Simply working with state
and local agencies, however, does not fully address the need to engage
with private businesses and organizations. As discussed in section
II.C., any cybersecurity planning must include private businesses, if
for no other reason than the fact private ownership makes up approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of critical infrastructure.182 FEMA can
utilize its coordination authority with other federal agencies to em-
power SSAs and give teeth to SSA recommendations in the private
174. PPD-21, supra note 29.
175. Id.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 5131(b) (2012).
177. EMAC, supra note 162, at 31, 54.
178. Crane, supra note 173, at 248.
179. Gavin Smith, Dylan Sandler & Mikey Goralnik, Assessing State Policy Linking
Disaster Recovery, Smart Growth, and Resilience in Vermont Following Tropical
Storm Irene, 15 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 66, 81 (2013).
180. § 5131(d).
181. Id.
182. STRATEGIC FORESIGHT INITIATIVE, supra note 43, at 3.
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sector. For example, in the aftermath of an event, FEMA often part-
ners with SSAs to provide disaster aid and relief to private parties
despite FEMA not being authorized to directly provide aid to private
business.183 For cybersecurity purposes, FEMA can utilize the exper-
tise of the SSAs on cybersecurity issues in a particular industry, then
push incorporation of plans and programs through the state agencies
to reach private parties through state regulation. Finally, FEMA can
connect state agencies with SSA-sponsored industry consortiums in
each infrastructure sector or cybersecurity-focused consortiums.
These industry consortiums improve safety and planning by drawing
on resources and knowledge of multiple companies and lower techni-
cal-planning requirements for public institutions.184
3. Hazard Declarations Must Include Verification of NIST
Framework Adoption
The final and arguably most necessary component is the adoption
of the NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cyber-
security, a vetted cybersecurity framework that can actually reduce
cyber threats and vulnerabilities through effective risk manage-
ment.185 The NIST Framework principles are a clear example of the
effectiveness of coordination for companies wrestling with cyber-
security.186 The NIST Framework outlines five high-level functions
that should be incorporated in any cybersecurity plan: (1) identify, (2)
protect, (3) detect, (4) respond, and (5) recover. The Framework is not
a checklist an organization runs for compliance but is a strategy docu-
ment designed to encourage a security mindset.187 The Framework
provides implementation tiers and security profiles designed to help
organizations identify weaknesses in their own planning and sys-
tem.188 At its core, the Framework is a strategy document that differ-
ent sizes and types of organizations can adopt and incorporate into
their own planning. Further, this proactive approach to cybersecurity,
which identifies the underlying vulnerabilities of systems instead of
responding after a singular attack, is an approach that is currently
183. Joseph E. Aldy, Real-Time Economic Analysis and Policy Development During the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1795, 1803 (2011) (explaining
FEMA coordinated with the Small Business Administration to provide economic-
injury disaster loans to small businesses operating in Louisiana in response to
the BP oil spill).
184. Id. at 1810.
185. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, WHY YOU SHOULD ADOPT THE NIST CYBERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK 3 (2014), www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/publica
tions/assets/adopt-the-nist.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZV8R-3CQU]; see also Hell-
mann, supra note 86, at 170 (explaining the Framework and analyzing criticisms
of its current lack of implementation).
186. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER, supra note 185, at 4.
187. NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 161, at 14.
188. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 170.
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being adopted in disaster response.189 The idea is these broad
frameworks are better able to address interconnected physical, social,
economic, and environmental systems.190 Thus, the goal of the NIST
Framework is adding the virtual and cyber ecosystem to the list.191
Although highly regarded, the NIST Framework does have its crit-
ics.192 The focus of most criticism is private companies and local and
state organizations are not required to adopt the NIST Framework.193
At the time President Obama issued Executive Order 13,636 and
PPD-21, DHS argued grants were the most effective way to incentivize
private companies to adopt the NIST Framework, but a grant incen-
tive program would require new statutory authority.194 This assess-
ment, however, was prior to PPD-41 and the explicit inclusion of
FEMA in the broader cybersecurity context.195
The major drawback of the NIST Framework is it is largely volun-
tary, and there is no enforcement mechanism to push states to better
prepare and adopt cybersecurity protocols for disaster response.196
The key to success would be to include the NIST Framework in the
state-level emergency plans so governors would be required to verify
the NIST Framework was incorporated and executed at the state level
during any request for disaster or emergency relief.197 As specified
earlier, the governor’s request for aid must articulate the state’s re-
sources cannot handle the incident and the state executed its state
emergency plans.198 It is in those emergency plans that FEMA can
mandate adoption of the NIST Framework.199 This enforcement
mechanism would be narrowly applied to cyber incidents during an
emergency response. States would continue to receive federal aid to
mitigate and stop the physical flooding or fire, but any financial relief
requested for cyber infrastructure systems would require a showing
the NIST Framework was adopted and utilized prior to the event in
question pursuant to FEMA authorities.200
189. Smith et al., supra note 179, at 72–73.
190. Id. at 74.
191. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 170.
192. Id. at 170–71.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. PPD-41 Annex, supra note 126.
196. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 170–71.
197. 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a) (2012).
198. Id.
199. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170(a), 5191(a) (2012).
200. Lake, supra note 134, at 95.
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IV. TEST CASE: HURRICANE ZOE STRIKES
GULF OF MEXICO
The intent behind the proposed modification to the Stafford Act
and rulemaking by FEMA is not to add another federal agency to the
cybersecurity ecosystem but instead to modernize FEMA and its au-
thorities to coordinate and respond to disasters or emergencies that
are either caused by a cyber event or worsened due to a cyber event.
The hypothetical test case is a Category 3 Hurricane, Hurricane Zoe,
that starts in the Gulf of Mexico, makes landfall on the southeast
coast of Texas, and ultimately strikes the Houston metropolitan area.
Houston serves as the location for the hypothetical hurricane due to
its significant role in the U.S. economy.201 The Port of Houston and its
supporting infrastructure are uniquely vital to the U.S. economy.202
Approximately 17 million people live within 300 miles of Houston, 50% of the
Unites States gasoline is refined in the port, it is the second largest pe-
trochemical facility in the world and the second largest port in the United
States in tonnage processed. [In addition, Houston is home to] Exxon-Mobil’s
largest refinery in the world and Dow’s largest petrochemical plant in the
western hemisphere.203
After Hurricane Zoe makes landfall in Galveston, Texas, the hurri-
cane moves northwest into Houston Bay and significantly damages
the Exxon Mobil Baytown Refinery before moving along the Houston
Ship Channel destroying other oil refineries, chemical storage facili-
ties, and power production plants and severing several natural-gas
pipelines.204 These facilities, each representing different key infra-
structure components, are modern facilities that are almost com-
pletely reliant on modern computer and networking systems.205
Similar to the circumstances at the Taum Sauk Dam, in subsection
II.A.2., a single pipeline facility has thousands of sensors, valves,
pumps, and controllers that are operated autonomously through the
facility’s SCADA system.206 It is likely the hurricane would trigger a
cascading failure where widespread power outages coupled with flood
201. See JOSEPH KRAMEK, THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE GAP: U.S. PORT FACILITIES
AND CYBER VULNERABILITIES 13–16 (2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con
tent/uploads/2016/06/03-cyber-port-security-kramek.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
E4F8-NR8F].
202. Id.
203. SUSAN VANDIVER ET AL., S. METHODIST UNIV., SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH
TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(2004).
204. Roy Scranton, When the Next Hurricane Hits Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2016, at
SR1, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/09/opinion/sunday/when-the-hurricane-
hits-texas.html.
205. JOSEPH A. WALSH II, CYBER THREATS TO PIPELINE SAFETY: VULNERABILITIES AND
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF CARE—WHAT THE C-SUITE AND PRACTITIONER NEEDS TO
KNOW (2017).
206. Id.
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waters would cause extensive damage and destruction to these facili-
ties and sever the distribution networks for the products of these facil-
ities to the broader United States.
A. Applying the Modified Stafford Act to the Hypothetical
Hurricane Zoe
Assume Houston’s emergency-response managers incorporated the
NIST Framework prior to the hurricane. The Governor of Texas deter-
mines the destruction is too severe for a state-level response, declares
a state of emergency, and requests assistance from the federal govern-
ment with certification of adoption of the NIST Framework. First, this
event would meet the broad definition of an incident causing physical
destruction or loss of cyber infrastructure. The definition is not con-
cerned with whether the event was initiated by a cyber system; in-
stead, it is focused on which components are destroyed. In the case of
Hurricane Zoe, the storm surge and high winds damaged and de-
stroyed facilities including the SCADA-system hardware on which the
facilities rely. Second, the Houston Port Authority, along with state
emergency-response authorities, would have been provided grants
through FEMA prior to the hurricane to incorporate the NIST Frame-
work in their emergency planning. Utilizing the NIST Framework, the
refineries and pipeline operators would have previously identified vul-
nerabilities within their systems to see what infrastructure compo-
nents their facility relies on (e.g., electric utilities) and what
infrastructure is relied on by other facilities (e.g., transportation and
fuel distribution).207 The key here is these entities would have identi-
fied the reliance prior to the hurricane and been able to build redun-
dancy by having backup systems further north, outside likely
hurricane zones. Under FEMA’s authority and oversight for state
preparedness compacts, neighboring states like Oklahoma, Arkansas,
and Louisiana would likely be aware of the same linkages and identi-
fied backup suppliers or alternate distribution networks for key infra-
structure. Finally, FEMA can then provide disaster aid for replacing
state-owned cyber infrastructure and coordinating with the SSAs and
Small Business Association (SBA) for interest-free loans and other
similar forms of relief for the private corporations involved.208
207. Id.
208. Smith et al., supra note 179, at 81 (noting that FEMA empowers state agencies to
distribute federal assistance at state level); see also Aldy, supra note 183, at 1803
(noting that FEMA can utilize SSAs to distribute aid to private parties despite
general ban on aid relief to private entities).
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B. Loss of Network Communications Between Southeast
Texas Refineries, West Texas, and Electric Utilities
The bulk of any destruction related to a natural disaster is typi-
cally localized to the area where the event occurred; however, the in-
creasing interconnectivity of autonomous systems allows the reach of
an incident to expand.209 This would be the case if a significant hurri-
cane struck Houston because of the substantial amount of regional in-
frastructure that relies on Houston’s energy sector.210 This is
especially true when it comes to the increasing use of networked and
smart electric utilities across all of Texas powered by wind energy.211
In the case of Hurricane Zoe, the concern is that a widespread destruc-
tion of natural gas refining and distribution, a key component to the
energy sector, could trigger ripple effects across Texas and neighbor-
ing states that would not typically be thought of as at risk from effects
of a hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico.212 Specifically, there is no guar-
antee the thousands of network nodes and sensors are designed for
such catastrophic failure of key pieces of the infrastructure.213 The
risk is that misread or miscommunicated signals can instead over-
whelm distant SCADA systems and trigger large-scale power
failures.214
Applying the new FEMA procedures will garner a similar response
to the actual physical destruction of the refineries in Houston. While
not directly affected by the hurricane itself, the West Texas windfarms
are a part of a complex chain of renewable-power generation that re-
lies on just-in-time supply of natural-gas energy from around the state
of Texas.215 Under the three types of cyber incidents, this would fit
squarely in the network-degradation-or-destruction category. The
communication infrastructure that empowers these networks, al-
209. Scheuermann, supra note 167.
210. Scranton, supra note 204.
211. Daniel Gross, The Night They Drove the Price of Electricity Down, SLATE (Sept.
18, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_juice/2015/09/texas_electri
city_goes_negative_wind_power_was_so_plentiful_one_night_that.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/2TCQ-3ERA]. The hallmark of smart grids is “nodes in the elec-
tricity network can communicate in real time with one another and respond to
new circumstances or needs. If a tornado knocks out the transformer at a gas
plant, a smarter grid could quickly pull more power from a wind farm.” Rob
Verchick, Our Energy Grid Is Incredibly Vulnerable, SLATE (Aug. 26, 2016), http:/
/www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/08/our_energy_grid_is_in-
credibly_vulnerable_to_climate_change.html [https://perma.unl.edu/C2P9-9
U9M]. These smart grids can revolutionize how the United States distributes en-
ergy by increasing both resiliency and efficiency but are almost totally reliant on
robust cyber networking. Id.
212. Verchick, supra note 211.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Gross, supra note 211.
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though not physically harmed or destroyed, may nonetheless be offline
or require rapid response to avoid broader cascading power failures.
The second component, building the NIST Framework into state com-
pacts, is geared toward forcing state utility regulators and private or-
ganizations both within and between states to better understand the
interdependencies inherent in their critical infrastructure.216 Here,
FEMA’s funding authority would enable Texas regulators and state
emergency personnel to receive funds to incorporate the NIST Frame-
work into emergency preparation. This preparation would likely have
highlighted the interdependency of these systems through application
of the NIST Framework to public utilities, specifically addressing con-
tingencies to power generation across the state with the loss of net-
works and nodes based in the Houston area. Finally, like the physical
destruction, the governor’s declaration of a natural disaster and certi-
fication the NIST Framework was incorporated would authorize
FEMA to provide direct assistance to state authorities and coordinate
funding and loan relief with the DoE and SBA.217
C. Cyber Attacks During Ensuing Hurricane Zoe Emergency
Response
The focus of this Comment is to highlight not all cyber incidents or
breakdowns are caused by malignant actors. Instead, cybersecurity
should be viewed more holistically as a means to maintain the integ-
rity, confidentiality, and availability of computers and computer net-
works.218 That said, critical-infrastructure entities and governments
at all levels are the victims of regular and expansive cyber attacks,
and this will likely increase during some sort of natural disaster or
emergency.219 The Hurricane Zoe hypothetical focuses on how the
modifications to the Stafford Act and FEMA’s coordination responsi-
bility affect infrastructure at the corporate or government level but
have not addressed individual victims of a cyber incident. Often in the
aftermath of major natural disasters, opportunistic thieves and crimi-
nal groups prey on individuals and companies as they attempt to re-
build.220 Assume that during Hurricane Zoe, a nonstate criminal
group utilizes the disarray after the storm to launch a sophisticated
spear-phishing attack on Exxon Mobil.221 The spear-phishing is
216. Hellmann, supra note 86, at 170.
217. Aldy, supra note 183, at 1803.
218. PPD-41, supra note 100.
219. WALSH, supra note 205.
220. Sue Marquette Poremba, How to Protect Your Identity During a Natural Disaster,
NBC NEWS (May 23, 2011), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43134564/ns/technology
_and_science-security/t/how-protect-your-identity-during-natural-disaster/
#.WPDc9VAzqL8 [https://perma.unl.edu/WZB7-BW55].
221. See Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What is Phishing?, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2015), https://
www.wired.com/2015/04/hacker-lexicon-spear-phishing [https://perma.unl.edu/
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targeted at Exxon Mobil’s Nigerian headquarters where the thieves
pose as staff from the Houston office needing help accessing Exxon
Mobil’s network for recovery. Posing as Houston engineers, the email
states they need help to backup several important files and requests
the Nigerian office download the file and upload it to the company
server. In reality, the file is a program that installs malware onto the
Nigerian system to gain access to Exxon Mobil servers. In the process,
the criminal group steals large amounts of sensitive logistical and pro-
prietary data on energy distribution across the United States.
Take a less sinister example where instead of targeting sensitive
data that could harm U.S. national security, the criminal group in-
stead launches a spear-phishing attack on Baker Botts LLP, a prestig-
ious Houston law firm with several offices around the world that
specializes in energy and natural-resource law. In this attack, the
criminal group targets several of the attorneys in the Houston office,
hoping to gain access to the firm’s London-based office to steal draft
agreements for a pending corporate merger. The phishing email poses
as the Texas Bar Association and contains a message that the Texas
Bar is trying to contact attorneys located in Houston to provide coun-
seling and assistance services. It provides a link to a website to regis-
ter that secretly contains malware that once uploaded onto the
victim’s computer is used to gain access to the Baker Botts
network.222
Both attacks, while targeting two very different types of organiza-
tions and two different types of data, would both clearly fall into the
criminal realm and outside the scope of FEMA’s expanded role of
cybersecurity. The central purpose of PPD-41 was to create a clear
cybersecurity framework at the federal level, and both of these inci-
dents are classic examples of incidents that should be investigated
and addressed through organizations like the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) and potentially DHS’s United States Computer
Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).223 The goal of incorporating
FEMA’s coordination authority is primarily to encourage and incen-
tivize, through grants and potentially post-disaster aid, the state and
6F44-CAYQ] (explaining spear-phishing emails are “designed to appear to come
from someone the recipient knows and trusts—such as a colleague, business
manager, or human resources department” and are “designed to trick [the recipi-
ent] into clicking on a malicious attachment or weblink”).
222. See id.
223. PPD-41, supra note 100; see also Kim Zetter, DHS Fears a Modified Stuxnet
Could Attack U.S. Infrastructure, WIRED (July 26, 2011), https://www.wired.com/
2011/07/dhs-fears-stuxnet-attacks [https://perma.unl.edu/JWT8-LSVZ] (explain-
ing Stuxnet could be modified to threaten other systems and describing US-
CERT as “a division of DHS that is responsible, in part, for coordinating the de-
fense of federal networks and working with the private sector to mitigate cyberat-
tacks against the nation’s critical infrastructure”).
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local levels to proactively address cybersecurity through adoption of
the NIST Framework and build better networked ecosystems that
take into account both the benefits and risks associated with cyber-
enabled systems. In this hypothetical, the goal would be for organiza-
tions like Exxon Mobil and Baker Botts to apply the NIST Framework
in order to anticipate an increased risk of spear-phishing and to have
exercised scenarios detecting and responding to such incidents. Thus,
FEMA’s central role is to promote coordination on minimizing the
harms suffered during a disaster or emergency, or in the words of Ben
Franklin, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.”
V. CONCLUSION
In today’s constant news cycle, it is easy to be bombarded by an
overly optimistic or pessimistic view of technology. The fact of the
matter, however, is technology is neither inherently good nor bad. In-
stead, society’s focus should be on a thoughtful analysis of how to util-
ize technology and incorporate it into the community. Societies have
undoubtedly benefited from the rise of personal computing and the
Internet, but with those benefits come associated risks and responsi-
bilities. It is these risks and responsibilities that require a new way of
thinking about cybersecurity, especially in critical infrastructure and
disaster response. Cyber technology has become interwoven through
the rise of smart cities, autonomous systems, and the entire emer-
gency-management apparatus. It is time FEMA and its authorities
under the Stafford Act reflect this shift and empower FEMA to serve
its coordination role to enable state and local authorities, in partner-
ship with private interests, to build resilient cities and communities
for the modern age.
